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Articles
MANDATORY SECURITIES INDUSTRY ARBITRATION:
THE PROBLEMS AND THE SOLUTION
DAVID
I.

A. LIPTON*

THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE
PARTIES TO ARBITRATION

In 1987 the Supreme Court, in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon,'
held that securities fraud claims based upon section
10(b) 2 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) and rule
lOb-5 3 promulgated thereunder are arbitrable claims. 4 For over
thirty years prior to McMahon, the federal courts had followed Wilho
v. Swan,' which permitted customers to disregard predispute commitments to arbitrate claims against their brokers when those claims
arose out of the federal securities acts.6 In Wilko the Supreme Court
found that the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act) provision voiding
* Professor of Law, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America.
Professor Lipton serves as an arbitrator for the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and the American Arbitration Association. He is also a member of the National Arbitration Committee of the NASD. B.A.,
Cornell University, 1966; M.A., Columbia University. 1968;J.D., University of Michigan
Law School, 1972.
1. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (1987).
4. 482 U.S. at 238.
5. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
6. Id. at 438. The federal securities acts relevant to this article are the Securities
Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a77bbbb (West 1981 & Supp. 1989)), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L.
No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7 8a-7811 (West 1981 &
Supp. 1989)).
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contracts that waive the Act's protections 7 was more important than
the Federal Arbitration Act 8 policy favoring arbitration agreements. 9 In McMahon the Court re-examined the methods and procedures of securities arbitration and determined that the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) now sufficiently supervises the
process to warrant the Court's refusal to extend the reasoning of
Wilko to the 1934 Act.' ° As a result of the McMahon decision, customers who had entered into predispute arbitration agreements
with their brokerage firms no longer could pursue their rule lOb-5
claims against their brokers in federal court. Following McMahon, a
number ofjurisdictions held that predispute arbitration agreements
are binding upon customers in regard to 1933 Act claims against
their brokers," as well as 1934 Act claims.' 2 In 1989 the Supreme
Court, in Rodriguez De Quyas v. Shearson/lAmerican Express,' 3 held that
predispute agreements indeed are binding upon customers in regard to 1933 Act claims. Because state law and common law claims
never were exempt from arbitration under the Wilko doctrine, McMahon and Rodriguez have had the net effect, for a customer entering
into a predispute arbitration agreement, of making virtually all
claims against the brokers arising out of disputes over the handling
of the customer's account subject to arbitration.
These consequences of McMahon and Rodriguez have brought
into sharp focus a host of concerns relating to the arbitration process for the legal and investment communities. These concerns include: (1) the limited ability of parties to arbitration to appeal the
findings of the arbitrators, (2) the limited discovery methods available in arbitration compared to those available in litigation, (3) the
absence of a reported, reasoned decision in arbitration, (4) the absence of a rule of precedent or stare decisis in arbitration, (5) the
7. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982).
8. Pub. L. No. 80-282, 61 Star. 669 (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-15
(West 1970 & Supp. 1989)).
9. 346 U.S. at 438.
10. Id. at 232-34.
1I. See, e.g., Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/Lehman Bros., Inc., 845 F.2d 1296,
1299 (5th Cir.), aft'd, 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1988); Reed v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 698 F. Supp.
835, 842-43 (D. Kan. 1988); Ryan v. Liss, Tenner & Goldberg Securities Corp., 683 F.
Supp. 480, 484 (D.N.J. 1988); Kavouras v. Visual Prods. Sys., Inc., 680 F. Supp. 205,
207-08 (W.D. Pa. 1988); Aronson v. Dean Wiuer Reynolds, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 1324,
1326 (S.D. Fla. 1987); Staiman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 673 F.
Supp. 1009, 1011 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
12. See, e.g., Reed, 698 F. Supp. at 841; Ketchum v. Almahurst Bloodstock IV. 685 F.
Supp. 786, 790 (D. Kan. 1988); McCowan v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 682 F. Supp.
741, 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
13. 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989).
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lack of guidance as to the administration of multiparty controversies, (6) the degree of control effected by the securities industry selfregulatory organizations in respect to the make-up of the typical arbitration panel, (7) uncertainties regarding the standards for admissibility of evidence, (8) the relative infrequency of punitive damage
awards, and (9) the collateral estoppel impact of arbitration on subsequent litigation and vice versa.
Many of the perceived problems with the securities arbitration
system do not reflect deficiencies in the operation of the current system, but rather are a result of the very qualities that make arbitration attractive. For example, participants in arbitration have a
limited right of appeal from arbitration awards precisely because
they contractually agreed to forego judicial litigation and instead
have their disputes considered in a more expeditious and less expensive forum. 4 It is reasonable to believe that if arbitration
awards were appealable for the full range of reasons for which judicial decisions may be appealed, the efficiency of the arbitration
mechanism would be reduced. Disputants who find that the benefits
of arbitration outweigh the sacrificed benefits of the judicial system
will support arbitration. Disputants who, however, do not appreciate the benefits of arbitration will not favor the system.' 5 Prior to
the McMahon and Rodriguez decision, the law applying to the enforceability of arbitration agreements generally accommodated both
the interests of plaintiffs who preferred arbitration as a means of
dispute resolution as well as the interests of those who did not.' 6
Subsequent to McMahon and Rodriguez, however, investors who perceived arbitration to be an unsatisfactory means of resolving disputes with their brokers generally were unable to avoid the
consequences of their predispute arbitration agreements.' 7 Thus,
these decisions created a new concern about the arbitration system.
This concern is not a function of the inherent nature of arbitration.
This new concern arises from the foreclosure of choice for investors

14. For evidence of the efficiency and economy of securities arbitration, see infra text
accompanying notes 34 & 36-37.
15. Investor discontent with securities arbitration has been discussed in the news
media. See, e.g., Zigas, Can "tSue Your Broker? It's No Big Loss, Bus. WK., June 22, 1987, at

128; Glaberson, When the Investor Has a Gripe, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1987, § 3 at 1, col. 2.
16. Prior to McAIahon, although there were a few decisions which suggested that arbitration could be compulsory, see, e.g., Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S.
213, 221 (1985); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 515-17 (1974). the majority position followed Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953) (permitting customers to
disregard arbitration agreements for claims arising from federal securities acts).
17. See supra note 12.
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as to whether to engage the arbitration system. Formerly, investors
could choose whether to submit their claims to arbitration and,
thereby, to experience the disadvantages and advantages inherent in
the nature of arbitration. After McMahon and Rodriguez, investors
who have entered into predispute arbitration agreements with brokers have little choice but to submit to arbitration any disputes arising out of their customer/broker relationship. This article focuses
on the question of how best to respond to this mandatory arbitration and on the attendant concerns of the investing public."8
II.

PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM THE INCREASED USE OF
MANDATORY ARBITRATION CLAUSES

The degree to which arbitration has or will become a
mandatory system for resolving disputes is not merely a consequence of Supreme Court opinions permitting the enforcement of
arbitration agreements;' 9 it also results from the pervasive brokerage industry practice requiring customers to enter into such arbitration agreements.2 ° In 1987, three months after the Supreme Court
decided McMahon, the SEC's Division of Market Regulation conducted a survey to determine how often brokers require arbitration
commitments from their customers. 2 ' The survey examined the
18. In responding to this concern, members of the North American Securities Ad-

ministrators Association in October 1988 approved a resolution opposing mandatory
arbitration of customer disputes with brokers. The group also proposed the adoption of
a uniform state rule prohibiting mandatory arbitration. 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
No. 41, at 1599 (Oct. 21, 1988).
Federal legislators also have been sensitive to investors' concerns with mandatory
arbitration. Two congressional sponsors of a bill designed to prohibit brokerage firms
from imposing on their customers a policy of mandatory arbitration, see H.R. 4960,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), described customers as being shocked and surprised to
discover, when conflicts arose with their brokers, that they no longer had recourse to the
courts. 134 CONG. REC. E2233 (daily ed. June 30, 1988) (statement of Rep. Boucher)
("Thousands of investors with complaints ... got a . . . rude shock when they learned,
frequently to their surprise, that they would have no recourse other than arbitration.");
134 CONG. REC. E2245, E2246 (daily ed. June 30, 1988) (statement of Rep. Markey)
("Confronted with abuses of discretion, misexecution of orders, and other wrongs committed against them, linvestors] were shocked to learn they had no recourse to the
courts of law.").
19. Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 1917, 1922
(1989) (agreements to arbitrate 1933 Securities Act claims are enforceable under Federal Arbitration Act); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238,
242 (1987) (agreements to arbitrate 1934 Securities Act and Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims are enforceable under Federal Arbitration
Act).
20. See infra text accompanying note 44.
21. Securities and Exchange Comm'n, Div. of Market Regulation, Summary of Staff
Findings With Respect to the Use of Predispute Arbitration Clauses (undated) [hereinaf-
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practices of sixty-five broker dealers, including twenty-five of the
largest member firms of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and
the twenty largest member firms of the National Association of Securities Dealers that.are not NYSE members."2 The survey found
that predispute arbitration agreements most frequently are required
of customers with margin and option accounts. In the study, ninetysix percent of the margin accounts held by firms offering such accounts were covered by predispute arbitration clauses. 2 3 Ninety-five
percent of retail option accounts held by firms that permit such options accounts were covered by arbitration agreements.2 4 Only
thirty-nine percent of cash accounts at the firms surveyed, however,
were covered by arbitration agreements. 25 With respect to cash accounts, which typically give rise to fewer legal problems than margin
or option accounts, only about sixty percent of the firms surveyed
even required their customers to sign customer account agreements.2 6 In the majority of instances when a customer account
agreement was required, however, an arbitration agreement was
contained therein.2 7
The firms covered by the SEC survey were asked whether they
would remove arbitration clauses at a customer's request. Four
firms had written policies providing that the firm generally would
not accept an account without the arbitration provision. 2" An additional fifteen firms had unwritten policies prohibiting waiver of the
clauses.' ) In eleven other firms, customer requests to delete the arbitration provisions were resolved on a case-by-case basis by senior
personnel.3s
Significantly, the SEC's survey found that firms intended to expand their use of arbitration clauses in response to recent judicial
developments. Twenty-five of the sixty-five firms surveyed indicated
that they either intended to adopt or were considering changes that
would expand the number of accounts covered by an arbitration
clause.3" Notably, six firms, representing forty-two percent of all
ter SEC Arbitration Clause Study], reported in I SECURITIES ARBITRATION COMMENTATOR,
July 1988, at 6.
22. SEC Arbitration Clause Study. supra note 21, at I.
23. Id. at 2.
24. id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 5.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 7.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 7.
31. Id. at 8.
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NYSE retail cash accounts, stated that they either would use, or consider using arbitration clauses in cash accounts.3 2 Thus, in the one
category of customer accounts for which brokerage firms historically
had not required arbitration clauses, there was a significant trend
toward their inclusion.3 3
The McMahon and Rodriguez decisions, in conjunction with the
industry's increased use of mandatory arbitration provisions, will result in greater industry reliance upon the arbitration mechanism to
resolve customer/broker disputes. Customers therefore will have
fewer opportunities to resolve disputes with brokers in judicial litigation, and arbitration ultimately may become a nearly universal
dispute resolution mechanism for customer/broker controversies.
Such increased reliance on arbitration will intensify public concern
with the arbitration process and also will generate additional operational problems for the arbitration system. These operational
problems could make arbitration less desirable as a dispute resolution device.
III.

OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM A UNIVERSAL
INDUSTRY PRACTICE OF CONDITIONING ACCESS TO
BROKERAGE SERVICES UPON THE EXECUTION OF
AN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT

Although arbitration offers participants certain benefits in
terms of cost and time efficiency, 34 there are several factors indicating why an industry practice of requiring potential adversaries to
arbitrate their disputes would be detrimental to the arbitration system and its users.
As an initial matter, a uniform industry practice compelling investors to enter into arbitration agreements to secure brokerage
services would reduce the credibility of the arbitration system. It is
axiomatic that customers are suspicious of goods or services which
they are required to purchase or use as a condition to obtaining
32. Id.
33. Id. at 5.
34. While it is commonly believed that arbitration generally is faster and less expensive than litigation, few studies have examined these issues in regard to securities industry arbitration. The NYSE recently commissioned the accounting firm of Deloitte
Haskins & Sells (DH&S) to conduct a survey comparing arbitration and litigation. In
1988, DH&S completed a report from that survey. Letter from DH&S to James E. Buck,
Senior Vice President and Secretary of the NYSE (undated) [hereinafter DH&S Arbitration Study] (available from the author) (referring to a study of six large retail brokerage
firms). The study concluded that the average lawsuit costs a brokerage firm $20,000 to
defend as opposed to only $8,000 for an average arbitration claim. Id. at Exhibit A.
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other desirable goods or services. Critics of mandatory arbitration
question why, if securities industry arbitration is as fair and protective of customer interests as the industry claims, compelled universal use of the system is necessary.3 5 An effective system, beneficial
to its customers, should attract voluntary customer use. Increased
use of mandatory arbitration, however, may generate public skepticism and concern that securities arbitration favors the industry to
the detriment of the customer.
Another significant consequence of mandatory arbitration is the
negative effect on the industry's impetus to provide a dispute resolution forum more efficient and less expensive than litigation. At
present, arbitrated customer/broker disputes generally are resolved
more quickly than litigated disputes. A recent study sponsored by
the NYSE found that the average customer/broker arbitration proceeding is completed nearly six months faster than the average litigated customer/broker claim.3 6 Based on a sample of 243 cases, the
study found that the average litigated dispute required 599 days to
complete, while the average arbitration lasted 434 days.3 7 The very
fact that the NYSE considered it necessary to study the time benefit
of arbitration over litigation demonstrates that the industry feels
competitive pressure in regard to the efficient operation of its dispute resolution system. If the industry effectively eliminated the judicial litigation alternative, the competitive pressures to improve the
time efficiency of arbitration proceedings would be greatly reduced.
Similar arguments might be made in regard to competitive pressures to maintain the fairness and cost efficiency of arbitration. The
NYSE study also analyzed the relative success of customers engaging in litigation and arbitration, comparing the amounts actually
awarded to plaintiffs through each respective adjudicatory system as
a percentage of the amounts claimed. On average, a claimant in arbitration received fifteen percent of the claim (for an average recovery of $35,000) as opposed to a plaintiff in litigation who on average
35. Rep. Boucher, when introducing arbitration legislation in 1988, noted that "if
arbitration is attractive to the consumer they will go to arbitration willingly. If the industry operated arbitration system cannot be shown to give the consumer a fair shake it is
clearly unfair to mandate that they sign compulsory arbitration agreements as a condition for dealing in securities." 134 CONG. REc. E2233 (daily ed. June 30, 1988).
36. DH&S Arbitration Study, supra note 34. at Exhibit A. The NYSE emphasized this
time efficiency aspect of arbitration in a recent letter to the SEC written in response to

an earlier SEC letter concerning predispute arbitration agreements. Letter from James
E. Buck, Senior Vice President and Secretary of the NYSE, to David S. Ruder, SEC
Chairman (Oct. 14, 1988) [hereinafter NYSE Arbitration Explanation Letter] (available
from author).
37. DH&S Arbitration Study, supra note 34, at Exhibit A.

888

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 48:881

recovered 2.6 percent of the claim (for an average recovery of
$25,000).8 Promulgation by the NYSE of such statistics favoring
recovery in arbitration indicates that the securities industry feels
pressure to justify its mandatory arbitration practices.
Perhaps the most significant reason for the securities industry
to reject a dispute resolution system that relies exclusively, or virtually exclusively, upon arbitration is that such a system would not
provide internal guidance on the current status of the law relating to
customer/broker relations. Such a system would also be incapable
of advancing the law regarding customer/broker relations when
such advancements are warranted. Securities industry arbitration
does not incorporate the principle of stare decisis. A rule of precedent in arbitration would be virtually impossible to achieve because
securities industry arbitration panels are not required to prepare
written, reasoned explanations for decisions rendered. s9 Although
arbitrators do not seek guidance from previous arbitration precedents to decide current issues, feedback regarding prior adjudications is critical to accommodate the decision-rendering operations
of the arbitration panels and to assist the parties in preparing their
written submissions and oral presentations. One basis for appealing
an arbitration award is the judicially created rule that an award may
be overturned if the arbitrators demonstrate "manifest disregard"
for the law. 4 ° While the parameters of this standard of judicial review are uncertain, 4 the standard is meaningless unless arbitrators
use legal precedent in rendering awards.4 2 Such precedential gui38. Id.
39. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953).

40. See id. (the' clear failure of arbitrators to decide in compliance with statutory provisions is grounds for vacating arbitration award); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith
v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933-34 (2d Cir. 1986) (disregard by arbitrators of "well-defined, explicit and clearly applicable" governing law will constitute grounds for setting
aside arbitration award).
4 I. See Lipton, The Standard on Which Arbitrators Base Their Decisions: The SROs Alust
Decide, 16 SEc. REG. L.J. 3 (1988). The debate is summarized in the article as follows:
[T~wo distinguishable interpretations regarding the meaning of the "manifest
disregard" standard can be found in the language of various judicial decisions.
On one hand, the standard can be interpreted to require that arbitrators comply with the law (although recognizing that mere errors of law will not constitute a basis for vacating an arbitration award). On the other hand, the standard
may be interpreted to mean that arbitrators need not comply with the law but
merely that their decisions not be offensive to tie law.
Id. at 1I.

42. In perhaps its most liberal characterization, Judge Mansfield of the Second Circuit explained "manifest disregard" of the law to require that:
[the arbitrator's] error must have been obvious and capable of being readily
and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitra-
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dance presently is obtained from the reported cases generated by
the judicial litigation system. If universal arbitration of broker/dealer controversies replaced judicial litigation, however, the
arbitration system no longer would find the same precedential guidance from reported case law. New issues--e.g., evaluating the suitability for accounts trading in index options, measuring the
churning in equity options accounts, determining the impact of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)4" on
broker/dealer activities-have been arising in the context of arbitrated and litigated customer/broker controversies. Those new
questions cannot be answered in a consistent and predictable manner by an arbitration system which does not generate precedents. If
universal use of predispute arbitration clauses reduces judicial litigation of customer/broker controversies to a trickle, the arbitration
system will be unable to obtain the benefits of precedential
guidance.
In conclusion, a universal securities industry practice requiring
customers to enter into predispute arbitration agreements would
create operational problems for the arbitration system and ultimately for the parties using the system. Such a practice would (1)
reduce the credibility of the arbitration system, (2) reduce the industry's competitive impetus to maintain a fair and efficient arbitration
system and most importantly, (3) deny the arbitration system the
precedential guidance which it receives when it operates in conjunction with a judicial litigation system based upon stare decisis. Despite these drawbacks, the securities industry is indeed increasingly
conditioning access to brokerage services upon the execution of arbitration agreements.4 4 In fact, with regard to margin and option
accounts, brokerage firms almost universally have imposed
mandatory arbitration.4 5 In light of the detrimental effect that universal mandatory arbitration will have on the public's reaction to
arbitration as well as on the operation of the arbitration system, it is
necessary to ask how the industry's trend toward the exclusive use of
arbitration can be discouraged.

tor. Moreover, the term "disregard" implies that the arbitrator appreciates the
existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decides to ignore or pay no
attention to it.
Bobker, 808 F.2d at 933.
43. Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. IX, 84 Stat. 941 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1961-1968 (West 1984 & Supp. 1989)).
44. See generally SEC Arbitration Clause Study, supra note 21.
45. Id. at 2-3.
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DISCOURAGING A UNIVERSAL INDUSTRY PRACTICE OF USING

PREDISPUTE ARBITRATION CLAUSES

Two models for discouraging or prohibiting the securities industry from universally requiring customers to execute predispute
arbitration agreements are analyzed below. The first model relies
upon a regulation prohibiting brokers from conditioning access to
their services upon the signing of arbitration agreements. 4 6 The
second model is based on a disclosure device to advise customers of
the effect of executing an arbitration agreement 4 7 and of the nature
of arbitration. Such disclosure would encourage competition
among brokers in offering customers a choice of forum for resolving
disputes with their broker.
A.

Regulatory Prohibition

The regulatory prohibition approach was proposed in a federal
bill which was introduced but not adopted during the second session of the one hundredth Congress. 48 That approach also was
taken in regulations adopted by Massachusetts, but enforcement of
the regulations was enjoined by a federal district court.4 9 The federal legislation would have prohibited brokers from entering into
any predispute arbitration agreement with a customer unless the
agreement was structured in accordance with procedures adopted
by the SEC.5 0 It was proposed that the SEC's rules, at a minimum,
46. This model is based on proposed federal legislation, as well as on regulations
promulgated in Massachusetts. See infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
47. See infra text accompanying notes 66-73.
48. H.R. 4960, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
49. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Connally, 703 F. Supp. 146, 161 (D. Mass. 1988), afd,
883 F.2d 1114 (1st Cir. 1989). On September 22, 1988, the Massachusetts Secretary of
State promulgated regulations, to become effective on January 1,1989, which essentially
would have banned mandatory arbitration practices by Massachusetts registered broker
dealers. MASs. REGS. CODE tit. 950, § 12.204(G)l.a to c (1988). For the pertinent text
of the regulations, see infra note 52. The regulations subsequently were found to be
preempted by the Arbitration Act and their enforcement was enjoined by the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Connally, 703 F. Supp. at 161.
50. The relevant portions of H.R. 4960 read as follows:
SECTION. I. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "Securities Arbitration Reform Act of 1988."
SEC. 2. MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS;
RULEMAKING AUTHORITY.
Section 15(c) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78o(c))
isamended by adding at the end thereof the following:
"(7)(A) No broker, dealer, or municipal securities dealer shall enter into
any agreement with a customer to arbitrate future disputes that may arise between the broker, dealer, or municipal securities dealer and the customer unless such agreement is entered into in accordance with procedures prescribed
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require that agreements to arbitrate: (1) be on separate pages and
be separately executed; (2) not be made a condition for entry into
an account agreement or be the basis for any fee differential; and (3)
prominently disclose to customers information that would inform
the customer of the consequences of entering into an arbitration
agreement. Agreements made in contravention of such rules would
be void. The proposed statute effectively would have prohibited
mandatory arbitration provisions and also would have prevented
brokerage firms from charging higher commissions to customers
who did not agree to commit to arbitration. 5
The Massachusetts ban on mandatory predispute arbitration
agreements, introduced in September 1988, made the brokerage
practice of requiring customers to enter into predispute arbitration
clauses a ground for denial, revocation or suspension of a broker's
registration with the State.5" The regulation made it a "dishonest or
by the Commission to afford the customer the opportunity to make an informed and voluntary decision to enter into such agreement.
-(B) The Commission shall, by rules, prescribe procedures to carry out
the requirements of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph. Such rules shall, at a
minimum, require the following:
"(i) Any agreement to arbitrate future disputes shall be on a separate
page and shall be separately signed.
"(ii)
Any agreement to arbitrate future disputes shall not be made a condition for entry into a customer account agreement, or be used as a basis for
any fee differential, or for granting, denying, conditioning, or limiting access to
any privilege, benefit, or service to the customer.
"(iii) Any agreement to arbitrate future disputes shall clearly and prominently disclose to the customer, in a form prescribed by the Commission, such
information concerning the consequences of entering into the agreement as
the Commission considers necessary or appropriate to the exercise of an informed and voluntary decision by the customer to enter into such an agreement.
"(C)
Any such agreement that has not been entered into in accordance
with procedures prescribed by the Commission pursuant to this paragraph
shall be void."
H.R. 4960, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
51. Id.
52. The Massachusetts regulations read as follows:
(G) Dishonest oi unethical praices in the securities business.
I. Broker-dealers. Each broker-dealer shall observe high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade in the conduct of its
business. Act [sic] and practices including but not limited to the following, are
considered contrary to such standards and constitute dishonest or unethical
practices which are grounds for denial, suspension or revocation of registration
or such other action authorized by law:
a. Requiring on or afterJanuary I, 1989, that a customer located in Massachusetts, other than a customer that is an institutional investor or financial
institution specified in 950 CMR 14.401(e), execute either a mandatory predispute arbitration contract or a customer agreement containing a mandatory
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unethical" practice for brokers to require customers, other than institutional investors or financial institutions, to execute mandatory
arbitration clauses as a nonnegotiable precondition to effecting
transactions in securities. 5 3
The approach taken by both the proposed federal legislation
and the state regulation essentially would prohibit brokers from requiring customers to agree, prior to a conflict, to arbitrate disputes
with their brokers. Affected brokers would be unable to realize the
cost savings arising from a dispute resolution system that exclusively
utilized arbitration. Further, the regulatory prohibition approach
would run counter to the goals of the national market system
(NMS). 5 4 The goals of the NMS include obtaining efficient and
best-price execution of securities transactions by linking the different securities markets and by promoting competition among the
various components of the securities markets. 5 5 An identified objective of the NMS is "fair competition among brokers and dealers." 56
The regulatory prohibition approach to mandatory predispute arbitration agreements, however, would restrict the ability of brokers to
effectively compete with one another for customer business on the
basis of price and services. That restriction on competition would
lead to a lesser variety of services available to the public. The restriction on competition among brokers that would result from the
regulatory prohibition approach as well as the corresponding diminpre-dispute arbitration clause that is a non-negotiable precondition to effecting
transactions in securities for the account of the customer or opening a securities cash account or margin account by the customer with such broker-dealer;
b. Requesting on or after January 1, 1989, that a customer located in
Massachusetts execute either a mandatory pre-dispute arbitration contract or a
customer account agreement containing a pre-dispute arbitration clause where
the contract or agreement fails to conspicuously disclose that the execution of
the contract or agreement cannot be made a non-negotiable precondition to
the opening by the customer of a securities account with the broker-dealer;
c. Requesting on or afterJanuary 1, 1989, that a customer located in Mas-

sachusetts execute either a mandatory pre-dispute arbitration contract or a customer account agreement containing a pre-dispute arbitration clause without
fully disclosing to the customer in writing the legal effect of the pre-dispute
arbitration contract or clause.
MASs. REGS. CODE tit. 950, § 12.204(G)l.a to c (1988).

53. id. § 12.204(G)l.a.
54. The national market system (NMS) is the trading system that was to result from
the regulatory and technological integration of the national securities markets as mandated by the 1975 Securities Reform Act which amended the 1934 Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7778111 (1975). The 1934 Act, as amended in 1975, specifically directs the SEC to facilitate
the establishment of an NMS. Id. § 78k-I(a)(2).
55. Id. § 78k-l(a)(l)(D).
56. Id. § 78k-I(a)(1)(C)(ii).

1989]

MANDATORY SECURITIES INDUSTRY ARBITRATION

893

ishment of brokerage services available to customers would be inconsistent with the goals of the NMS.
The relative cost of litigation and arbitration is another factor
to consider in determining how best to discourage a universal industry practice of using predispute arbitration clauses. The average
customer/broker litigation costs a brokerage firm two and one-half
57
times as much as the average arbitration of a comparable matter.
Cost savings from arbitration provide an operational advantage for
brokerage firms that resolve customer disputes by arbitration. In a
regulatory permissive environment--one that permits brokers to require mandatory arbitration-this operational advantage invites
brokerage firms to compete on one of two alternative planes--one
relating to arbitration operations and another relating to other firm
operations. First, firms could maintain a practice of including
mandatory arbitration provisions in the customer account agreements and use the resulting cost savings to reduce charges for services currently offered or to offer additional services at no additional
cost. Such additional services could include expanded research
services, financial planning guidance, and personalized investment
advice. Firms that elect to compete on the basis of expanded services or reduced service costs will do so in the belief that greater revenues will be generated due to improved services or reduced costs,
producing a net gain that overcomes any losses attributable to customer dissatisfaction with mandatory arbitration.
As an alternative competitive strategy for gaining increased customer business in a regulatory permissive environment, some brokerage firms will allow customers to choose the method for
resolving disputes with their brokers (and thus forego the cost advantage of arbitrating all disputes). These firms will seek to maintain an acceptable level of profits by reducing litigation
expenditures. Methods for reducing litigation expenditures might
include: (1) increasing the efficiency of in-house legal operations
and reducing unnecessary use of outside counsel, (2) being more
amenable to settlement as a means of lessening legal expenditures,
and (3) improving supervision of brokers to reduce disputes that
give rise to litigation.
Thus in a regulatory permissive environment, it is economically
sensible for brokerage firms to compete by expanding services and
reducing costs as well as by permitting customers to choose the dispute resolution forum. If a firm chooses to compete as to alterna57. See supra note 34.
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tive dispute resolution forums, then it must attempt to, reduce
litigation costs. In a regulatory prohibition environment-i.e., one
prohibiting mandatory arbitration-a firm must commit resources
toward reducing litigation costs. Pressure on the firm to provide
customers with alternative services and cost savings as compensation for a mandatory arbitration practice is removed because arbitration simply would not be permitted. The planes upon which
brokerage firms would be likely to compete are reduced in a regulatory prohibition environment as opposed to in a regulatory permissive environment. That reduction in competition is inconsistent
with the objectives of the NMS. 5 s It probably would result in a reduced variety of brokerage services available to customers, as well as
reduced brokerage competition as to the fees charged for such
services.
In addition to the effects discussed above, a regulatory prohibition environment could reduce the number of brokers participating
in the retail brokerage business and increase commission costs for
all retail customers. Litigation is a more expensive means for brokerage firms to resolve disputes with customers than arbitration.5 9
If brokerage firms were compelled to absorb those increased costs,
it is probable that some firms would reduce or eliminate their retail
operations and apply their capital to more profitable operations.
Commission revenues represent a declining portion of total securities industry revenues. Operations such as principal trading by brokerage firms provide an increasingly larger percentage of industry
revenues. Between 1973 and 1987 the percentage of industry revenues generated by commissions dropped from fifty-five percent to
twenty-four percent. 60 As the securities industry becomes less dependent upon retail customer business, a number of firms may be
unwilling to remain in this aspect of the business when confronted
with increased operational costs.
As an alternative to cutting back on retail customer operations,
brokerage firms might find themselves compelled to include in their
commission charges the increase in operational costs that would result from a prohibition on mandatory arbitration provisions. If the
prohibitions on mandatory arbitration include prohibitions on differential commission rates (linked to whether a customer chose to
execute an arbitration provision), then the increased commission
rates would be across the board. The 1988 federal legislative pro58. See supra text accompanying note 56.
59. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
60. Wallace. Pervasive Impact of 'Day Traders', N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1988, at D6, col. 3.
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posal would have included a provision prohibiting differential commissions based upon a party's willingness to forego a litigation
remedy. 6 ' In a regulatory environment prohibiting differential commissions, customers would have no opportunity to weigh the financial worth of choosing a dispute resolution forum against the cost of
the increased commission rate.
Ultimately, if the regulatory prohibition approach dramatically
reduced the numbers of matters arbitrated in the securities industry,
the industry's impetus to maintain an efficient and inexpensive alternative dispute resolution system would diminish. With limited numbers of customers seeking the benefits of arbitration, the industry
might not be motivated to analyze and improve the system. Even
the SEC paid relatively little attention to the specific operations of
the securities industry arbitration system prior to the McMahon decision6" and the resulting unprecedented growth in the arbitration
caseload. It was not until several months after the Supreme Court
decided McMahon that the SEC issued its first comprehensive set of
recommendations as to how the industry should improve its arbitration operations.6 3 At that time, the industry's arbitration system
had been operating under its uniform rules for a decade without any
major operational evaluation by the SEC." Diminished use of arbitration would not result in an abandonment of the arbitration alternative, but fewer industry and regulatory resources probably would
be devoted to an activity that is underutilized as opposed to an activity that is well utilized.
B.

Full Disclosure in Conjunction with Competition

An alternative to the regulatory prohibition model for avoiding
61. For the relevant text of H.R. 4960, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), see supra note
50.
62. From the point in 1977 when the Commission encouraged the securities industry
to adopt a Uniform Code of Arbitration (Securities Exchange Act Release No. 13,470
[1977-78 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 81,136 (Apr. 26, 1977)), until
shortly after the McMahon decision was handed down, there is no record of the Commission staff systematically analyzing the operations of securities industry arbitration.
63. Letter from SEC Director of Division of Market Regulation to Various Self-regulatory Organizations Which Conduct Arbitration (Sept. 10, 1987) (available from author) (containing recommendations-based on a staff study of the arbitration systemfor improving arbitration).
64. See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 233-34 (1987).
The Court noted that although the SEC had expansive powers to ensure the adequacy of
the arbitration procedures employed by the self-regulatory organizations, the SEC thus
far had refused to conduct an operational evaluation of the arbitration system. Id. at
233.
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a universal industry practice of mandatory arbitration agreements is
an approach requiring brokerage firms to disclose to customers the
effect of executing an arbitration agreement. The disclosure device
would advise customers of the nature of arbitration, and its very
existence hopefully would stimulate brokerage firm competition in
allowing the customer to choose the dispute resolution forum.
Under this disclosure model, brokerage firms would be required to
explicitly disclose to customers: (1) the limitations of arbitration as
compared to litigation and (2) the fact that by signing an-arbitration
agreement, the customer forfeits the right to litigate disputes. Brokers would be permitted to deny their services to customers who
rejected arbitration clauses. Customers, however, would be free to
bargain with brokers regarding the inclusion of the arbitration
clause in their account agreement.
The intended effects of disclosure would be to alert customers
to the special nature of arbitration and to encourage brokerage
firms to compete in regard to their mandatory arbitration practices.
Firms that believe that they would have a competitive advantage
over other firms in terms of their legal costs in litigation would offer
their customers a choice in regard to their dispute resolution forum
(forum-neutral firms). Other firms, believing that their operational
strengths are found in areas other than efficient legal operations,
would compete by modifying or expanding services unrelated to dispute resolution or by reducing fees. Firms that choose to compete
through nondispute resolution services or fees would not be restricted in their competitive choice by the need to absorb the costs
of litigating, as opposed to arbitrating, customer disputes. The
competition arising because of disclosure would insure that
mandatory arbitration would not be a universal industry practice.
At the same time, the disclosure model, by allowing firms to choose
in which areas to compete and by not requiring firms to absorb the
costs of litigating customer disputes, would provide a greater variety
of brokerage services and fees than the regulatory prohibition
model.65
The disclosure model, by focusing greater customer and industry attention on arbitration clauses, would stimulate competition
among brokerage firms. Firms specifically would advise their customers that they forfeit certain advantages of litigation by signing an
arbitration agreement. Such disclosure and customer assent re65. For a discussion of the regulatory prohibition model, see supra text accompanying notes 48-64.

1989]

MANDATORY SECURITIES INDUSTRY ARBITRATION

897

quirements would result in certain customers, for whom it is economically worthwhile, bargaining with brokerage firms to omit the
arbitration clause from the customer agreement. Predictably, some
customers would "shop" for forum-neutral brokerage firms. This
body of customers would insure that some brokerage firms would
adopt the forum-neutral approach. A firm will elect to become (or
remain) forum-neutral if the value of the increased business resulting therefrom exceeds the increased litigation costs resulting from
being forum-neutral.
For disclosure to effectively stimulate competition among brokers in regard to a choice of dispute resolution forum, guidelines
should be provided as to the minimum information that the firms
must include in customer agreements containing arbitration provisions. The disclosure must alert customers to the differences between arbitration and litigation as well as to the consequences of
executing an arbitration agreement. Self-regulatory organizations
(SROs) that conduct securities arbitration proposed rules requiring
such disclosure.6 6 These rules were approved by the SEC in the
Spring of 1989.67 The SRO rules, as approved, identify the following information as necessary for disclosure: (1) the final and binding nature of arbitration,68 (2) the fact that execution of an
arbitration agreement results in a waiver of the parties' right to seek
remedies in court including the right to a jury trial,6 9 (3) the more
limited nature of discovery in arbitration as compared to judicial litigation,7 ° (4) the fact that arbitration awards need not include factual
findings or the legal bases for the award, 7 (5) the limited right of
appeal of arbitration awards,72 and (6) the fact that arbitration
panels typically will include a minority of arbitrators who are or
were affiliated with the securities industry.7 3 In addition to requiring specific disclosure information, the SRO rules also require the
highlighting of the disclosed information within the customer agree66. For example, see notice of the proposed rules of the NYSE and NASD regarding
disclosure of arbitration provisions and other matters dealing with arbitration, as well as
amendments thereto published in 54 Fed. Reg. 15,860 (Apr. 19, 1989), 54 Fed. Reg.
9955 (Mar. 8, 1989), 54 Fed. Reg. 6224 (Feb. 8, 1989), 54 Fed. Reg. 3883 (Jan 26.
1989), and 53 Fed. Reg. 45,640 (Nov. 10, 1988),.
67. Securities Exchange Act Re. No. 34-26805 (May 10, 1989) (Current Binder],
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1 84,414 [hereinafter New Arbitration Rules Release].
68. New Arbitration Rules Release, supra note 67, at 80,111-3.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. d.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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ment as well as the highlighting of a statement, immediately preceding the signature line, to the effect that the agreement contains an
arbitration agreement.7 4 The Commission predicted that when the
disclosure rules become effective, 75 they "should promote more
knowledgeable acquiescence or rejection by customers of arbitration provisions.

' 71

Other disclosure provisions also could be added to the SRO
rules to more completely describe the operation of the securities
arbitration system. For example, some investors might find it important to know that-unlike the standard procedure used in commercial arbitration-the arbitrators for a securities hearing panel
are chosen not by the parties but by the arbitration forum administrator. Also, the fact that arbitrators frequently are guided by commercial wisdom, and not by a rule of law, in resolving disputes could
influence a person's decision to execute an arbitration agreement.
In addition to the disclosure of information concerning the nature
of arbitration, investors should be advised that there is no uniform
securities industry practice concerning customer freedom of choice
as to dispute resolution forum. 7 7 Such disclosure would alert customers that they need not execute an arbitration agreement with a
firm requiring mandatory arbitration to obtain brokerage services.
Then, each customer could evaluate whether the benefits of a choice
of dispute resolution forum are sufficient to warrant the effort necessary to find a suitable "forum-neutral" broker. This advice to customers concerning the absence of a uniform mandatory arbitration
agreement policy also would encourage the development of industry competition in permitting customers to choose a dispute resolution forum.
Under certain circumstances the disclosure model may prove
ineffective. The securities industry might determine that the additional retail customer business obtainable through a forum-neutral
policy would not offset the additional litigation costs resulting from
such a policy-the result being a uniform mandatory policy. Disclosure then would prove to be an ineffective means for providing customers a choice of dispute resolution forum. At that point, the
74. Id.
75. The disclosure rules were approved by the Commission on May 10, 1989, and
became effective 120 days later. Id. at 80,114 n.61.
76. Id. at 80,113.
77. The Commission reported that "Jalt least five of the nation's largest broker-dealers, with offices around the country . . .do not require the signing of account agreements for individual cash accounts that do not otherwise require documentation in
connection with other services provided in the account." Id. at 80,111-3 n.51.
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industry's oversight bodies would need to reconsider adopting the
regulatory prohibition approach. The regulatory prohibition approach, however, has the disadvantages of reducing the variety and
availability of brokerage services and increasing the cost of brokerage services. 7 8 Thus, brokers should not be regulatorily prohibited
from conditioning the provision of services on customers' agreeing
to arbitration, unless it is demonstrated that industry competition
regarding a forum-neutral policy will not develop in response to the
new disclosure provided to customers.
V.

SUMMARY

Securities industry arbitration is thought to be a more efficient
and expeditious method of dispute resolution than litigation. 79 Certain operational limitations, however, are inherent in the nature of
arbitration.8" Historically, securities industry customers, even after
executing predispute arbitration agreements, could weigh the benefits of arbitration against its limitations and then decide whether to
arbitrate or litigate claims against their brokers. 8 McMahon and
Rodriguez virtually eliminated this freedom of forum choice for customers who have executed arbitration agreements.8 2 The absence
of choice in regard to a dispute resolution forum presents problems
for investors who would prefer to litigate these claims. Increasing
use of mandatory arbitration agreements within the securities industry intensifies these problems for investors.
Universal mandatory arbitration creates problems for the securities industry as well as for individual customers. Mandatory arbitration (1) reduces confidence in the industry arbitration system,8 3 (2)
diminishes the industry's impetus to maintain and improve the efficient operation of the system,8 4 and most significantly, (3) ultimately
will severely restrict-if not eliminate-the precedential feedback
from judicial litigation."- This feedback is essential to parties pre78. For a discussion of the regulatory prohibition model, see supra notes 48-64 and
accompanying text.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 14-18.
80. Id.

81. See supra text accompanying note 14.
82. See Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 1917,
1919-21 (1989); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238
(1987).
83. See supra text accompanying note 35.
84. See supra text accompanying note 38.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 40-43.
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paring arbitration cases and to the reasoned formation of arbitration
awards.
Thus, a universal mandatory arbitration practice would have
identifiable negative results. Two models are evaluated herein as
possible responses to the potential universal industry practice. The
first model-regulatory prohibition-was proposed in Congress and
was adopted by at least one state regulatory body.8 6 The other
model-disclosure in conjunction with competition-has been proposed by securities industry SROs and approved by the SEC.8 7
Both approaches are intended to eliminate an industry practice of
universal mandatory arbitration. The regulatory prohibition model
has the disadvantage of discouraging competition among brokers in
regard to services offered to customers. Limiting competition is inconsistent with the goals of the NMS. 8 8 In addition the regulatory
prohibition approach might well reduce the number of brokers willing to conduct a retail brokerage business. Finally, the regulatory
prohibition model could reduce industry use of arbitration, thereby
limiting the industry's willingness to maintain and improve the arbitration system as an attractive alternative to judicial litigation. The
disclosure in conjunction with competition approach does not suffer
from these disadvantages. Rather, the disclosure approach encourages competition among firms.
For these reasons disclosure in conjunction with competition is
the model of choice for avoiding a universal or nearly universal industry practice of conditioning brokerage services upon the execution of an arbitration agreement. The success of this approach,
however, depends on the development of industry competition in
regard to permitting customers to choose a dispute resolution forum. Now that this approach has been implemented, its effects
should be studied to determine if the desired competition results.

86. See supra notes 50-52.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 66-76.
88. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.

